Forums

[Sexual Harassment Panda]

Originally posted by sgtclub
http://www.instapundit.com

Well, I for one am shocked that the guy gave himself a good grade. But Phil Carter, former operational planner in the 4th Infantry Division, isn't as impressed with Franks as Franks is.

It may well be the case that CENTCOM operational plan 1003-V succeeded during Phase III of the war — that is, the major combat phase. Indeed, it can be argued that this plan succeeded spectacularly, leading to what has been called "catastrophic success". But what is abundantly clear, both to national security experts on the left and right side of the aisle, is that this same plan spectacularly failed when it came to Phase IV of the operation. CENTCOM's plan, and the plans of CENTCOM's subordinate units, failed to anticipate catastrophic success as a possibility; it failed to effectively plan for worst-case scenarios of chaos and lawlessness; it failed to put adequate security and stability and nation-building resources on the ground quickly enough; and it failed to interface with the other departments of government, namely the State Department. The result is the mess we're in today. How in the world do these events vindicate Gen. Franks' judgment?

Answer: they don't. And Gen. Franks even says they don't in his book. Gen. Franks speaks to the issue of post-war planning and security a couple of times in his book, at one point laying the blame on senior Washington officials to give him sufficient policy guidance. Mr. Boot may not have read the same meaning in these words as I did, but then again, he hasn't served as an operational planner or even in uniform, so he may have missed the subtext. Let's turn to pages 351-2, and the description of an OPLAN brief from Dec. 2001 to President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Sec. Rumsfeld and Sec. Powell, among others:

"It was understood that the final phase, Phase IV--post hostility operations-- would last the longest: years, not months. ... The endstate of Phase IV included the establishment of a representative form of government in a country capable of defending its territorial borders and maintaining internal security, without any weapons of mass destruction.

I was aware that Phase IV might well prove more challenging than major combat operations..." [emphasis added]
Analysis: You have to have sat through a few OPLAN briefings to understand why this is significant. Here, Gen. Franks briefed the President and the NSC principals that Phase IV entailed significant strategic and operational risk, and that there was no good solution yet for Phase IV. Yet, the discussion afterwards focused entirely on WMD, Scuds, issues with allies, and other issues focused on Phase III. No one asked Gen. Franks about Phase IV; it seemed like an afterthought. That makes sense because the White House and Pentagon leaders saw Operation Iraqi Freedom as Desert Storm II in many ways — where we dodged the post-war issue by limiting our objectives and pulling out rapidly. This passage implies that Gen. Franks was aware of the problem, but his bosses weren't — and he didn't pop a starcluster to let them know of the problem.

read more here: http://www.intel-dump.com/archives/a...tml#1092580373