Quote:
Originally posted by Not Me
I know that is your theory, that a just-conceived embryo really isn't sufficiently like a person to warrant protection. However, what I have yet to hear explained is how you arrived at that theory. Why is an embryo not sufficiently like a person to warrant protection. What is it that makes a being sufficiently like a person to warrant protection?
And why is viability the line at which a fetus becomes sufficiently like a person to warrant protection? What is so special about viability that it tips the scales in favor of the fetus rights? Oh wait, scratch that, it is the particular person/involuntary servitude thing. Sorry, I forgot. I was distracted momentarily by all the pretty colored marshmallows floating in my cereal.
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Hypothesize a muddy hillslide in the rain, a slippery slope if you will. A newly conceived fetus -- smaller than one of your marshmallows! -- is at the top of the hillside, and it slips, and rolls, slowly, until it reaches the bottom, where it is a newborn little baby.
If that fetus were dependent on me, I'm comfortable that I would have many fewer qualms about aborting that fetus at the top of the hillside -- not no qualms, but fewer -- than I would about smothering the baby at the bottom, but what with the mud and rain and all, I have a very hard time deciding where on that hillside my mind would change.
